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Conflict monitoring is a process of stimulus evaluation and a pre-requisite for subsequent
recruitment of cognitive control and behavioral adaptations. This study investigated
how experimentally manipulated working-memory-related cognitive demand and aversive
reinforcement modulate individual differences of conflict monitoring intensity and
behavioral adjustments. Individual differences were assessed by means of an anxiety-
related trait dimension (trait-BIS) and by means of reasoning abilities—a core determinant
of intelligence. Moreover, we investigated the special role of verbal reasoning ability and
figural reasoning ability for the modulation of the conflict monitoring intensity. Ninety
participants performed a go/nogo task with four conditions each comprising a combination
of low vs. high working-memory-related cognitive demand and low vs. high aversive
reinforcement. No effect of aversive reinforcement was observed for the N2 amplitude.
The fronto-central nogo N2 amplitude was more pronounced for high demand vs. low
demand suggesting that cognitive demand served as an aversive costly event. Higher
total reasoning abilities were associated with more intense conflict monitoring and shorter
response times with increasing aversive reinforcement (defined as verbal error-feedback
vs. monetary loss). Individuals with higher trait-BIS scores demonstrated a more intense
conflict monitoring even in conditions with low aversive reinforcement and also a more
cautious responding (i.e., response times slowing) with increasing aversive reinforcement
indicating a focus on negative feedback prevention. The findings provide evidence for the
conflict monitoring theory and suggest that working-memory-related demand overrules
the impact of aversive reinforcement on conflict monitoring intensity. Reasoning abilities
and anxiety-related traits go along with an intensification of conflict monitoring but
differences in the flexibility of behavioral adjustment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) is an important neural
structure in the medial frontal cortex and plays a central role
for the integration of negative affect, pain, and cognitive control
(e.g., Bekker et al., 2005; Shackman et al., 2011). Models on
conflict monitoring and error monitoring have been developed
to derive predictions on adjustments in ACC-related cognitive
control (Botvinick et al., 2004; Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Botvinick,
2007; Shenhav et al., 2013) and error detection (Ullsperger and
von Cramon, 2003; Yeung et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2007; Moser
et al., 2013). Based on these models, the involvement of the dorsal
ACC or the dorsal midcingulate cortex (MCC) in neural responses
to working-memory-related cognitive demand, cognitive control
(e.g., Vogt, 2009; Shenhav et al., 2013; Hernandez Lallement et al.,
2014), and negative feedback or aversive reinforcement (Amodio
et al., 2008; Leue et al., 2009, 2012b; Riesel et al., 2012) has
been intensively investigated. Studying the role of determinants
that modulate the intensity of conflict monitoring and error
monitoring facilitates our knowledge on how individuals recruit
and adjust cognitive control (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012;
Weldon et al., 2013) and compensate inefficiency i.e., for infor-
mation processing (e.g., Moser et al., 2013). However, effects
of working-memory-related cognitive demand and aversive rein-
forcement on conflict monitoring have not yet been investigated
simultaneously. Thus, the present study aimed at investigating
these combined effects on conflict monitoring because it is likely
that working-memory-related demand and aversive reinforce-
ment occur simultaneously when conflict monitoring is required.
Since effects of working-memory-related demand and aversive
reinforcement are likely to be modulated by individual differences
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in reasoning ability and anxiety-related differences, the present
study aimed at investigating these effects of cognitive and non-
cognitive individual differences on conflict monitoring.
The ACC—and in particular the dorsal ACC—has been shown
to monitor task difficulty (Botvinick et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; Botvinick and Rosen, 2009) resulting in greater ACC
activity in high cognitive demand conditions than in low cognitive
demand conditions (Botvinick et al., 2009). Accordingly, higher
task difficulty and required cognitive demand should intensify
conflict monitoring but individuals might differ in the efficiency
with which they deal with situations that require higher cognitive
demand (see below) and in their strategies to discount effort
(Botvinick et al., 2009; Vogt, 2009; Shenhav et al., 2013).
Task difficulty during conflict monitoring could come along
with variations of the go-nogo ratio in go/nogo tasks (Schacht
et al., 2009; Leue et al., 2012a). In case of an asymmetric go-
nogo ratio (e.g., 80% go vs. 20% nogo stimuli) go responses
are predominant and, thus, making adjustments in the motor
plan more difficult. Moreover, the manipulation of cognitive
demand by means of the go-nogo ratio probably parallels to
oddball paradigms that evoke more stimulus-related aspects of
conflict monitoring and subsequent cognitive control (Folstein
and Van Petten, 2008) along with different requirements to adjust
the motor plan of responses (Hewig et al., 2011). Although de-
confounding conditions of cognitive demand and aversive rein-
forcement, Leue et al. (2012a) found that the nogo N2 amplitude
was more pronounced in high vs. low cognitive demand condi-
tions at posterior sites. This finding suggests that the go-nogo
ratio activates the stimulus-driven attentional system in poste-
rior areas of the brain and bottom-up control (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007). Leue et al. (2012a) could
not rule out that manipulating cognitive demand by means of
the go-nogo ratio might have been a rather weak manipulation
of cognitive demand and, thus, might have facilitated evidence
for a predominant role of aversive reinforcement during conflict
monitoring especially in individuals with higher anxiety scores as
predicted in the revised reinforcement-sensitivity-theory (Corr,
2004, 2008). Thus, it was important to identify an indepen-
dent variable that allows for a more intense manipulation of
cognitive demand. Recent models on conflict monitoring pro-
posed working memory load as a promising measure of cogni-
tive demand during conflict monitoring and cognitive control
(Gray and Braver, 2002; Botvinick, 2007; Braver, 2012). Therefore,
we used working memory load as a manipulation of cognitive
demand in the present study in order to investigate the inter-
play of cognitive demand and aversive reinforcement on conflict
monitoring.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies
indicate that the dorsal ACC is prominently involved in the
processing of cognitively demanding events that require working
memory (e.g., Gray and Braver, 2002; Braver et al., 2007;
Hernandez Lallement et al., 2014). These fMRI studies suggest
that conflict monitoring is more intense when working-memory-
related cognitive demand is high. In accordance with relevant
theoretical accounts (Yeung and Cohen, 2006; Botvinick, 2007;
Eysenck et al., 2007), it can be expected that those conflict
monitoring tasks that require substantial amounts of working
memory load are likely to activate the ACC during conflict
monitoring. However, until now no evidence for an intensified
ACC-related conflict monitoring in a working-memory-related
condition has been shown for the N2 component of the event-
related-potential (ERP). The N2-component has been introduced
as an indicator of conflict monitoring that occurs about 250 ms
post-stimulus with a most negative peak at fronto-central sites
(Donkers and van Boxtel, 2004; Yeung et al., 2004; Amodio et al.,
2008; Schacht et al., 2010; Leue et al., 2012a). Several studies
demonstrated dipole generators of the N2 component in the
ACC (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Amodio et al., 2008; Aarts and
Pourtois, 2010; Leue et al., 2012a) also supporting the proposal
that the ACC and more specifically the dorsal ACC is prominently
involved in conflict monitoring and error monitoring,
respectively. Moreover, the ACC-related N2 component is more
pronounced following rarely occurring nogo trials compared to
go trials in go/nogo tasks. Consequently, the N2 component will
be used as an indicator of conflict monitoring in the present study
and we expect that the ACC-related N2 component is sensitive
to variations of working-memory-related cognitive demand
during conflict monitoring. Since working-memory-related
cognitive demand and aversive reinforcement have been mostly
investigated in separate conflict monitoring studies, less is known
about the combined effects of working-memory-related cognitive
demand and aversive reinforcement on conflict monitoring.
The manipulation of conflict monitoring intensity by means
of working memory load implies that those individual differences
that are associated with working memory capacity (WMC) like
reasoning ability and general fluid intelligence (Gf; Kyllonen
and Christall, 1990; Süß et al., 2002; Burgess and Braver, 2010)
might affect conflict monitoring intensity. Reasoning ability (i.e.,
a core determinant of intelligence that is related to verbal,
numerical, and figural abilities) as well as Gf (i.e., the ability
to solve problems, to recognize patterns and to learn, Cattell,
1971) are closely related to individual differences of working-
memory capacity (Kyllonen and Christall, 1990; Engle et al.,
1999; Süß et al., 2002). It has been emphasized that reasoning
ability closely matches Gf (Cattell, 1987; Süß et al., 2002) and it
has been shown that verbal and numerical abilities (Süß et al.,
2002) are also relevant for the investigation of WMC (Colom
et al., 2004). Therefore, we will use the term “total reasoning”
subsequently in order to separate different aspects of total rea-
soning like verbal, numerical, and figural reasoning (Süß et al.,
2002). Thus, total reasoning can be decomposed according to
the verbal, numerical or figural content (Figure 1), on which
the reasoning tasks are based (Beauducel et al., 2001). Engle
et al. (1999) argued that Gf and WMC reflect the ability to
keep a representation active, especially when interference and
distraction occur. Since conflict monitoring has been related to
cognitive resources required to deal with the interference caused
by distractors (Weldon et al., 2013), we investigated whether Gf
is closely related to conflict monitoring as has been suggested in
prior fMRI studies (Gray et al., 2005; Burgess and Braver, 2010).
Moreover, individuals with higher WMC have been described
to engage in a more flexible adjustment of cognitive control
(Weldon et al., 2013). Since a positive association of WMC and
reasoning has been demonstrated (Kyllonen and Christall, 1990;
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FIGURE 1 | Predicted and observed associations between individual
differences (reasoning ability and trait-BIS), experimentally
manipulated working-memory-related cognitive demand, and aversive
reinforcement on conflict monitoring. The dotted line represents a link
between reasoning ability and experimentally varied aversive reinforcement
on conflict monitoring that was not initially predicted but observed in the
data. The dashed line between reasoning and conflict monitoring was
predicted but not observed in the data. Gf = General fluid intelligence.
Oberauer et al., 2007) we predict that individuals with higher total
reasoning ability should demonstrate more flexibility in tasks that
require intense conflict monitoring and subsequent behavioral
adjustments. A more flexible adjustment of behavior implies
that individuals with higher reasoning ability should be better
prepared for fast and correct responses. Accordingly, we expect
that the enhanced adjustment flexibility of individuals with higher
total reasoning ability is related to an intensified ACC-related
conflict monitoring (i.e., more negative N2 amplitude) and better
subsequent behavioral performance in tasks that require cognitive
control. Since total reasoning closely matches Gf, we also expected
individuals with higher Gf scores to show a more pronounced
N2-related conflict monitoring intensity. This association of Gf
and conflict monitoring should be observable especially for the
figural reasoning tasks (e.g., matrices) that have been proposed
as measures of Gf (Cattell, 1987). Moreover, Süß et al. (2002)
found a strong association between verbal/numerical WMC and
verbal reasoning. We therefore expect that verbal reasoning is
related to conflict monitoring in addition to total reasoning and
Gf especially when the task requirements are verbally coded.
Similarly, figural reasoning or Gf should be related to conflict
monitoring when the task is primarily based on figural material.
These predictions on reasoning and conflict monitoring imply
that working-memory-related individual differences serve in its
own rights as a determinant of conflict monitoring intensity and,
thus, independently of an experimental manipulation of working-
memory-related cognitive demand (Figure 1).
Regarding the role of anxiety-related traits during conflict
monitoring, we refer to the revised reinforcement-sensitivity-
theory (rRST; Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Corr, 2008; Leue
and Beauducel, 2008), which postulates individual differences
with regard to conflict detection and resolution. In rRST, aversive
reinforcement has been hypothesized to intensify conflict detec-
tion and resolution. Specifically, the behavioral inhibition system
(BIS) as a neural system is thought to detect conflict informa-
tion. Accordingly, individuals with higher anxiety-related scores
(named as trait-BIS, Carver and White, 1994) have been predicted
to show a more active BIS resulting in an intensified conflict mon-
itoring especially when aversive reinforcement is likely to occur
following erroneous responses (e.g., Corr, 2008). This prediction
has been confirmed in prior N2 studies that applied aversive
verbal reinforcement and monetary loss, respectively, as feedback
in conflict monitoring tasks (e.g., Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al.,
2012a,b). Therefore, we expected in this study that higher vs.
lower Trait-BIS individuals demonstrate a more intense conflict
monitoring and that this intensification of conflict monitoring
is most pronounced in higher vs. lower Trait-BIS individuals in
conditions with more intense aversive reinforcement (i.e., mon-
etary loss). Thus, contrary to individual differences of reasoning
ability an intensification of conflict monitoring in higher trait-BIS
individuals is related to situations with externally applied aversive
reinforcement (Figure 1).
To summarize, the manipulation of cognitive demand by
means of working memory demand was combined with an inves-
tigation of individual differences in total reasoning, verbal reason-
ing, and Gf because these abilities are expected to modulate the
conflict monitoring intensity in situations that require working-
memory-related cognitive demand. Moreover, the manipulation
of aversive reinforcement was combined with an investigation of
individual differences in the sensitivity for aversive reinforcement
(trait-BIS), which is important, because trait-BIS is expected to
modulate the aversive reinforcement effect. Thus, the experi-
mental manipulations of aversive reinforcement and cognitive
demand are paired with those individual differences that might
modulate the respective treatment intensity at the individual
level.
By using a go/nogo task that proved valid for the investigation
of the N2-component as an index of the conflict monitoring
intensity (Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al., 2012a,b), we manip-
ulated aversive reinforcement by means of negative feedback
(low vs. high) and cognitive demand by means of the required
working memory load (low vs. high). Presuming a fronto-central
N2 topography, we hypothesized that (a) the N2 component
should be more negative to nogo than to go stimuli because rarely
occurring nogo stimuli require more intense stimulus evaluation
and comparison than responding to frequently occurring go
stimuli suggesting a more intense conflict monitoring to nogo
stimuli compared to go stimuli (e.g., Donkers and van Boxtel,
2004; Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al., 2012a). We expected the
nogo N2 component to be (b) more negative for high-demand
than low-demand because in the high working-memory-related
demand conditions three different nogo-stimuli have to be kept
in mind and compared to one go stimulus whereas a single nogo-
stimulus has to be kept in mind in the low-demand conditions
and compared to a single go stimulus (see Section Go/nogo task).
(c) The N2 component should be more negative for high vs.
low aversive reinforcement conditions. (d) Higher total reasoning
scores as well as Gf and verbal reasoning ability were expected
to intensify conflict monitoring resulting in a more negative N2
component. (e) With regard to personality, we expected that
higher Trait-BIS individuals show a more intense conflict mon-
itoring (i.e., more negative N2 component) under high vs. low
aversive reinforcement.
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METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
A total of N = 97 right-handed students of the University of
Hamburg, Germany, took part in this study. The sample of the
present study is completely independent of the sample reported
in Leue et al. (2012a). Due to a large number of artifacts in
the EEG data (for artifact rejection criterion see below), n = 7
participants had to be excluded because they had less than 25
artifact-free nogo epochs in each of the four task conditions (see
below). Thus, N = 90 participants (46 male) were available for
statistical analysis (age: M = 26.63 years, SD = 4.05; range: 18–
42 years). All participants took part voluntarily in this study and
gave written informed consent at the beginning of the study.
The ethical board of the German Foundation of Psychologists
evaluated the experimental protocol of the present study among
a larger set of project studies using go/nogo tasks. No ethical
concerns of the experimental protocols have been raised.
MEASURES
Participants filled in the German version of the BIS/BAS scales
(Strobel et al., 2001), which was originally published by Carver
and White (1994). The BIS/BAS scales comprise 7 trait-BIS items
and 13 trait-BAS items. All items can be answered on a 4-point
Likert-type scale. The trait-BIS scale measures individual differ-
ences of aversiveness sensitivity and the trait-BAS scale measures
individual differences of reward sensitivity. Cronbach’s alpha coef-
ficients of both subscales were moderate (trait-BIS: 0.81, total
trait-BAS: 0.74,) and widely comparable to prior studies (Carver
and White, 1994). In order to give a more complete account of
rRST and because problems with the suppression of predominant
responses have been shown for high trait-BAS individuals (Lange
et al., 2012) it was also explored whether individual differences
in the sensitivity for appetitive reinforcement (trait-BAS) were
related to conflict monitoring although no specific assumptions
on this relation are investigated here (but see Gray and Braver,
2002; Leue et al., 2012b). The trait-BIS scale and the trait-BAS
scale did not significantly correlate, r(90) = 0.04, p = 0.70 (two-
tailed).
Total reasoning ability was assessed with a verbal analogy task
(items 21–40, Cronbach’s alpha: 0.59), a numerical calculation
task (items 61–80; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.81), and a figural matri-
ces task (items 161–180; Cronbach’s alpha: 0.65) of the basic
module of the Intelligence-Structure-Test 2000 R (I-S-T 2000 R;
Liepmann et al., 2007; Beauducel et al., 2010). Since the figural
matrices correspond exactly to other tests like Raven’s Advanced
Progressive Matrices (Raven et al., 1998) that are widely used
as measures of Gf (e.g., Burgess and Braver, 2010), the figural
matrices are described as Gf measures in the following. Cron-
bach’s alpha of the total reasoning scores (0.82) was moderate.
Handedness was investigated with the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All participants included in this study
reported to be right-handed.
GO/NOGO TASK
With regard to trial sequence and trial timing, the go/nogo
task of this study corresponds to the task description presented
in prior studies (Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al., 2012a). Go
and nogo stimuli were presented in an 80:20 ratio with 200 go
stimuli and 50 nogo stimuli comprising each task condition.
Go and nogo stimuli were geometric forms, that is either a
square or a circle. The present go/nogo task combined a low
vs. high cognitive demand condition and a low vs. high aver-
sive reinforcement condition in a within-subjects-design. Each
task block incorporated the combination of a demand level
and a reinforcement level resulting in the following task con-
ditions: (a) low demand/low aversive reinforcement; (b) low
demand/high aversive reinforcement; (c) high demand/low aver-
sive reinforcement; (d) high demand/high aversive reinforce-
ment. Cognitive demand was manipulated by means of work-
ing memory load. The low demand condition required par-
ticipants to respond to a white colored geometric shape (go
stimulus, e.g., a white square) and to withhold responses to
the other white colored geometric shape (nogo stimulus, e.g.,
white circle, Figures 2A and B). The high demand condi-
tion required participants to respond to one pre-defined col-
ored go stimulus (e.g., blue colored square) and to withhold
responses to three different nogo stimuli that varied in color
and shape across task conditions (e.g., nogo stimuli could be a
blue circle, a brown square, or a brown circle, Figures 2C and
D).
Whereas the low cognitive demand condition required less
working memory load because participants had to keep in mind
only the shape of the pre-defined nogo stimulus, the high demand
condition required more intense memory load because both color
and shape must be inspected in order to respond correctly. Low vs.
high levels of aversive reinforcement were realized in accordance
with our prior studies on conflict monitoring in that low aversive
reinforcement was defined as a negative verbal feedback such as
“too slow” or “error” (Leue et al., 2012a,b). Too slow feedback was
presented when responses to go stimuli occurred between 500 and
1000 ms post-stimulus. High aversive reinforcement was defined
as a combination of aversive verbal and monetary reinforcement
(for short: monetary loss) such as “too slow: −2 Ct” or “error:
−2 Ct” (Leue et al., 2012a,b). A trial sequence comprised a 1000
ms lasting fixation cross followed by a 100 ms lasting go or nogo
stimulus. Responses were required within 500 ms after stimulus-
offset although responses to go stimuli were recorded up to 1000
ms stimulus-offset in order to determine “too slow” responses.
In case of erroneous responses to nogo stimuli, non-responses to
go stimuli or in case of too slow responses to go stimuli negative
feedback (low vs. high depending on task condition, Figure 1) was
provided for 1000 ms. In case of correct responses within the 500
ms interval to go stimuli and in case of correct non-responses
to nogo stimuli, respectively, no feedback was provided and the
screen remained black for 1000 ms. The inter-trial-interval was
1000 ms.
PROCEDURE
Participants were recruited through announcements on a bulletin
board and an electronic platform announcing recent research
projects at the University of Hamburg, Germany. Participants
who were interested in this study were instructed in a telephone
call to omit alcohol use, to avoid unusual caffeine and nicotine
consumption, and to avoid taking any medication the day before
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FIGURE 2 | Trial sequences of go and nogo trials in the low
working-memory-related cognitive demand condition (A and B) and
in the high working-memory-related cognitive demand condition (C
and D) along with examples of low aversive reinforcement (i.e.,
verbal error feedback) and high aversive reinforcement (i.e., verbal
error feedback and monetary loss).
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EEG recording. All participants reported that they have never had
any neurological disorder. At the beginning all participants gave
written informed consent and were then seated in a comfortable
chair. The chair was placed about 95 cm from the 20 inch flat
screen that was used to present the go/nogo task. The room
where the EEG was recorded was electrically shielded, sound-
attenuated, and well-lit. Presentation V12.1 (Neurobehavioral
Systems, Albany, NY) was used to present the go/nogo task. All
participants performed four practice trials in the low demand
conditions (i.e., watching the go and the nogo stimulus twice) and
eight practice trials in the high-demand condition. Participants
were informed in the instruction that erroneous responses to
nogo stimuli or too slow responses to go stimuli (i.e., responses
occurring between 500 and 1000 ms after stimulus-offset) would
result in verbal error feedback (“error!”) or too slow feedback
(“too slow!”) in the low aversive reinforcement conditions. Aver-
sive verbal feedback and monetary loss would occur in case of
erroneous responses (“error: −2 Ct!”) or too slow responses
(”too slow:−2Ct!”) in the high aversive reinforcement conditions
(Ct = cent). Participants were also informed that no feedback
would be given for correct responses to go stimuli and correct
non-responses to nogo stimuli. Doubling the number of practice
trials in the high demand conditions was due to the fact that
participants should have the opportunity to watch the go trial
and the three nogo trials twice —as in the low demand condition.
The experimenter sat in an adjacent room, where EEG data were
saved to disk. The experimental session lasted approximately 100
min and was divided into four 15 min blocks during which
EEG was recorded. Each of the four task blocks comprised one
of the four task conditions of the go/nogo experiment. After
finishing the task, participants received a basic payment of 15 e
and an additional payment of maximal 10 e depending on their
performance during the go/nogo task conditions with monetary
loss, resulting in a maximum payment of 25 e. The order of the
four task conditions was counter-balanced so that each of the four
task conditions was once presented in the first, second, third, and
fourth position, respectively. Among these four task conditions
go and nogo shapes were alternated so that participants were
asked to respond to a circle in one task condition (go stimulus),
whereas a square was the go stimulus in the next condition.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four task
condition sequences (sequence 1: n = 22, sequence 2: n = 22,
sequence 3: n = 23, sequence 4: n = 23).
EEG RECORDING AND PROCESSING
EEG recording, quantification, and analysis were conducted
with reference to the guidelines for the study of human ERPs
(Picton et al., 2000). EEG was recorded with 64 scalp active
electrodes from the ActiveTwo BioSemi system (BioSemi, Amster-
dam, Netherlands) based on the extended 10/20 system (Chatrian
et al., 1988). The electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded from
two horizontal electrodes placed beyond the epicanthi of both
eyes and one vertical electrode located approximately 1 cm below
the right eye. As per BioSemi’s design, the ground electrode
during acquisition was formed by the Common Mode Sense
active electrode and the Driven Right Leg passive electrode. All
bioelectric signals were digitized on a laboratory computer using
FIGURE 3 | Raw waveforms of go trials (A) and nogo trials (B) for
combined working-memory-related cognitive demand and aversive
reinforcement levels at FCz (N = 90).
ActiView software (BioSemi). The impedances were below 25 k
during EEG recording. The EEG was sampled at 512 Hz. Off-
line analysis was performed by using EEGLab v11.4.0.3b based on
MATLAB 7.14.0.739 (The MathWorks, 2012). All data were band-
pass filtered (1–15 Hz, Leue et al., 2013) and were re-referenced
to averaged mastoids. Independent Component Analysis (ICA;
an automated infomax decomposition) was applied to correct
for ocular artifacts. Further technical and muscle artifacts were
rejected when the EEG signal exceeded ±75 µV. Artifact-free
epochs were separately segmented for go and nogo trials with
correct responses lasting 700 ms after stimulus onset with a pre-
stimulus baseline of 100 ms. The percentage of ERP epochs with
artifacts varied between 5.6% and 13.8% indicating a good EEG
signal quality. Comparable to prior studies, the N2 component
peaked about 270 ms post-stimulus in an interval between 250–
290 ms post-stimulus (Figure 3) and has a clear fronto-central
topography (Figure 4). The N2 amplitude was quantified as
the mean amplitude in the interval between 250–290 ms post-
stimulus. The mean N2 amplitude was analyzed in this study
because it is more reliable than the peak N2 amplitude (i.e., peak
minus baseline) in go/nogo tasks with about 20–30 nogo epochs
per task condition (Luck, 2005; Leue et al., 2013).
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS 22.0. A repeated
measures ANCOVA was conducted for the behavioral data (go
response times and sensitivity d′). Sensitivity d′ was computed
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 210 | 6
Leue et al. Working-memory-related cognitive demand and reasoning ability
FIGURE 4 | Topographical maps for combined working-memory-related cognitive demand and aversive reinforcement levels of 64 electrode sites of
the nogo N2 component (N = 90).
according to Stanislaw and Todorov (1999). Sensitivity d′ has
been introduced in the signal detection theory as a parame-
ter of response accuracy taking the relative frequency of cor-
rect responses and commission errors into account. Conflict
monitoring should result in the recruitment of top-down con-
trol and successful behavioral adaptation (i.e., more correct
responses and fewer incorrect responses). The repeated mea-
sures ANCOVAs of the behavioral data included Go-Nogo
stimulus type (2 levels: Go vs. Nogo), Cognitive demand (2
levels: low vs. high), and Aversive reinforcement (2 levels: low
vs. high) as repeated measures factors. Gender and Task con-
dition sequence were used as between-subjects factors in the
repeated measures ANCOVA. Mean-centered trait-BIS, trait-BAS,
and total reasoning sum scores were entered as continuous
variables (MacCallum et al., 2002). In addition, we con-
ducted the same repeated measures ANCOVA including the
three reasoning subscales instead of the total reasoning sum
scale.
The repeated measures ANCOVA of the mean nogo N2 ampli-
tude included Region (3 levels of mean N2: frontal (F3, Fz, F4),
central (C3, Cz, C4), parietal (P3, Pz, P4) and Laterality (3 levels
of mean N2: left (F3, C3, P3), middle (Fz, Cz, Pz), and right (F4,
C4, P4))) as repeated measures factors as well as Go-Nogo stimu-
lus type, Cognitve demand, and Aversive reinforcement. Gender
and task condition sequence were again the between-subjects
factors. Mean-centered trait-BIS, trait-BAS, and total reasoning
sum scores were entered as continuous variables (MacCallum
et al., 2002). Again, we conducted the same repeated measures
ANCOVA including the three reasoning subscales instead of the
total reasoning sum scale. In all repeated measures ANCOVAs
Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon has been used in order to correct for
sphericity violation of the repeated measures factors. Partial eta
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Means and standard errors of mean go response times for
low vs. high working-memory-related cognitive demand and (B) scatter plot
for mean go response times and total reasoning scores.




A non-parametric test on the number of error of omissions and
error of commissions (collapsed across the four task conditions)
indicated that the participants made more commission errors on
nogo trials (M = 4.40, SD = 3.15) than omission errors on go trials
(M = 3.95, SD = 2.95), Wilcoxon-test, p< 0.05. As the descriptive
statistics indicate, commission errors and omission errors were
rather seldom.
RESULTS OF GO RESPONSE TIMES
For mean go response times, an Aversive reinforcement main
effect was observed, F(1,79) = 4.28, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.05. A
significant Cognitive demand main effect, F(1,79) = 15.48, p <
0.01, ηp2 = 0.16, indicated longer go response times in high Cog-
nitive demand compared to low Cognitive demand conditions
(Figure 5A). Go response times in the monetary loss feedback
conditions were longer (M = 250.42 ms, SE = 2.95) compared to
the verbal error feedback conditions (M = 246.80 ms, SE = 2.83).
With regard to the main effect of go response times was
significant for the total Reasoning score, F(1,79) = 7.42, p <
0.01, ηp2 = 0.09. ANCOVA parameter estimates suggested that
higher total Reasoning ability were associated with shorter go
response times (Figure 5B). Moreover, an Aversive reinforcement
× Trait-BIS interaction was observed, F(1,79) = 3.85, p < 0.05,
ηp
2 = 0.05, but no Trait-BIS main effect on go response times,
F(1,79) = 2.02, p = 0.16. Parameter estimates for Trait-BIS revealed
that individuals with higher Trait-BIS scores had longer go
response times with increasing Aversive reinforcement conditions.
Moreover, an Aversive reinforcement×Trait-BIS×Gf interaction
for go response times, F(1,71) = 3.99, p = 0.05, ηp2 = 0.05, was
observed. ANCOVA parameter estimates indicated that individ-
uals with higher Trait-BIS and higher Gf scores had shorter go
response times with increasing Aversive reinforcement (i.e., dif-
ference scores of high Aversive reinforcement minus low Aversive
reinforcement have been established).
RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY D′
With regard to sensitivity d′, we observed an Aversive reinforce-
ment main effect, F(1,79) = 7.72, p< 0.01, ηp2 = 0.09, with a higher
sensitivity d′ occurring for high Aversive reinforcement (M = 4.29,
SE = 0.08) vs. low Aversive reinforcement (M = 4.15, SE = 0.08).
The Cognitive demand main effect for sensitivity d′ was not
significant, F(1,79) = 0.01, p = 0.99. The tendency of a Cognitive
demand × Aversive reinforcement interaction, F(1,79) = 3.48, p =
0.07, ηp2 = 0.04, suggested a significant Aversive reinforcement
main effect under low Cognitive demand indicating an increase
of sensitivity d′ from low Aversive reinforcement (M = 4.10,
SE = 0.09) to high Aversive reinforcement (M = 4.34, SE = 0.09),
F(1,79) = 8.06, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.09. A Trait-BAS main effect for
sensitivity d′, F(1,79) = 5.40, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.06, indicated a
higher sensitivity d′ with higher Trait-BAS scores. For sensitivity
d′, we did not observe any main effects or interactions with Trait-
BIS, total Reasoning or the Reasoning subscales.
RESULTS OF THE N2 AMPLITUDE
The Region main effect of the mean N2 amplitude was signifi-
cant, F(2,158) = 129.49, p < 0.01, ε = 0.62, ηp2 = 0.62. Simple
contrasts revealed the most pronounced mean N2 amplitude at
frontal sites (M= −0.97 µV, SE = 0.28), F(1,79) = 141.34, p <
0.01, ηp2 = 0.64, and central sites (M= 0.14 µV, SE = 0.25),
F(1,79) = 153.66, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.66, compared to parietal
sites (M= 2.13 µV, SE = 0.21). The Go-Nogo stimulus main
effect was significant, F(1,79) = 281.20, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.78,
with the Go N2-amplitude (M = 2.68 µV, SE = 0.24) being
less pronounced than the Nogo N2-amplitude (M = −1.81 µV,
SE = 0.28) suggesting a more intense conflict monitoring to
nogo stimuli than to go stimuli (hypothesis a). As predicted in
hypothesis b, the Cognitive demand main effect was significant,
F(1,79) = 17.85, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.18, indicating a less positive
N2 amplitude (i.e., more intense conflict monitoring) in high-
demand conditions (M= 0.78 µV, SE = 0.20) compared to low-
demand conditions (M= 0.10 µV, SE = 0.27). Moreover, the
Region × Go-Nogo-Stimulus × Cognitive demand interaction
of the N2 amplitude was significant, F(2,158) = 8.02, p < 0.01,
ε = 0.61, ηp2 = 0.09. Separate ANCOVAs for Go and Nogo stimuli
revealed a significant Region × Cognitive demand interaction
for Nogo stimuli, F(2,158) = 12.96, p < 0.01, ε = 0.66, ηp2 =
0.14, but not for Go stimuli, F = 1.01, ns. For Nogo stimuli,
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FIGURE 6 | Means and standard errors for the region x
working-memory-related cognitive demand interaction of the mean
nogo N2 amplitude (negative values represent more intense conflict
monitoring).
FIGURE 7 | Scatter plot for the total reasoning scores and the mean N2
amplitude slopes from low to high aversive reinforcement (collapsed
across electrode sites).
the N2 amplitude was most negative at fronto-central sites in
high Cognitive demand conditions compared to low Cognitive
demand conditions (Figure 6). This suggests that higher cognitive
demand served as an aversive teaching signal during ACC-related
conflict monitoring (Botvinick, 2007).
The Aversive reinforcement main effect of the N2 amplitude
was not significant (hypothesis c), F(1,79) = 0.41, p = 0.53. Neither
the interaction of Aversive reinforcement × Cognitive demand,
F(1,79) = 1.23, p = 0.27, the Region × Aversive reinforcement
interaction, F(1,79) = 0.01, p = 0.97, nor the Region × Aversive
reinforcement × Cognitive demand interaction, F(1,79) = 0.45, p
= 0.55, was significant.
With regard to individual differences, we observed a ten-
dency of an Aversive reinforcement× total Reasoning interaction
(hypothesis d), F(1,79) = 3.74, p = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.05. This interaction
indicated that higher total Reasoning scores were associated with
a more pronounced decrease of the mean N2 amplitude (more
negativity) with increasing Aversive reinforcement. For illustra-
tion of this N2 effect a scatter plot of the high minus low Aversive
reinforcement difference was computed (Figure 7).
In order to investigate the specific effects of Gf and Verbal
reasoning on conflict monitoring (hypothesis d) repeated mea-
sures ANCOVA including the Reasoning subscales and allowing
for interactions between covariates were performed. A significant
main effect was observed for Verbal reasoning, F(1,71) = 4.99,
p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.07. Parameter estimates unexpectedly revealed
that higher Verbal reasoning scores were related to more positive
mean N2 amplitudes. The Go-Nogo × Gf interaction, F(2,158) =
9.42, p< 0.01, ηp2 = 0.12, could be traced back to a Gf main effect
for nogo stimuli, F(1,71) = 7.45, p< 0.01, ηp2 = 0.10, but not for go
stimuli, F < 1, ns. Parameter estimates for Gf revealed that higher
Gf scores were related to more negative nogo N2 amplitudes. An
interaction of Gf × Verbal scores for the N2 amplitude was not
observed. However, a significant main effect for Verbal reasoning
occurred, F(1,71) = 4.99, p< 0.05, ηp2 = 0.07. Parameter estimates
unexpectedly revealed that higher Verbal reasoning scores were
related to more positive mean N2 amplitudes. Finally, a Go-nogo
× Aversive reinforcement × Trait-BIS interaction was significant
(hypothesis e), F(1,71) = 7.90, p< 0.01, ηp2 = 0.10. Again separate
ANCOVAs for Go and Nogo stimuli were conducted and could
be traced back to a significant Aversive reinforcement× Trait-BIS
interaction of the nogo N2 amplitude, F(1,71) = 3.98, p = 0.05,
ηp
2 = 0.05, but not of the go N2 amplitude, F(1,71) = 0.07, p = 0.80.
Parameter estimates for Trait-BIS suggested that higher Trait-BIS
scores were associated with more negative nogo N2 amplitudes in
conditions with low aversive reinforcement.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated variations of the conflict moni-
toring intensity by means of working-memory-related cognitive
demand (low vs. high) and aversive reinforcement (low vs. high)
in a go/nogo task. The dorsal ACC is a prominent area in the
brain that monitors effects of task difficulty and aversive rein-
forcement during conflict monitoring (Gray and McNaughton,
2000; Botvinick et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Moreover,
the frontal N2 component as a reliable indicator of ACC-related
conflict monitoring intensity (Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al.,
2013) was thought to indicate variations of conflict monitoring.
In accordance with our prediction (a) the N2 amplitude was more
negative following nogo compared to go stimuli. With regard
to cognitive demand, we observed—as expected—(b) a more
negative N2 amplitude for higher vs. lower cognitive demand
in nogo trials, but not in go trials. (c) The N2 amplitudes did
not differ in conditions with high vs. low aversive reinforcement
and we did not observe interactions of aversive reinforcement ×
cognitive demand. (d) Higher reasoning scores were related to
more negative nogo N2 amplitudes (i.e., more intense conflict
monitoring) with increasing aversive reinforcement. Moreover,
we observed that higher Gf scores were associated with more
intense conflict monitoring especially to nogo trials, whereas
higher verbal reasoning scores were related to less intense conflict
monitoring. Although no individual differences of trait-BIS alone
were observed for the nogo N2 amplitude, (e) more pronounced
conflict monitoring was found in individuals with higher trait-BIS
and verbal reasoning scores and in higher trait-BIS individuals
in low aversive reinforcement conditions. Moreover, higher trait-
BIS individuals showed a slight response times slowing with
increasing aversive reinforcement. In order to elucidate variations
of the conflict monitoring intensity and subsequent processes like
reactive control, adjustment flexibility, and processing efficiency
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we subsequently discuss these N2 findings in association with the
behavioral findings.
WORKING-MEMORY-RELATED COGNITIVE DEMAND AND CONFLICT
MONITORING
First of all, although fMRI data show a pronounced activa-
tion of the dorsal ACC indicating intense conflict monitor-
ing when cognitive demand is high (e.g., Vogt, 2009; Shenhav
et al., 2013; Hernandez Lallement et al., 2014), the modula-
tion of the fronto-central nogo N2 amplitude of the ERP by
means of working-memory-related cognitive demand is a new
finding. Our nogo N2 findings support Botvinick’s (2007) pre-
diction that higher cognitive demand intensifies conflict moni-
toring. Moreover, go response times suggest that experimentally
manipulated high cognitive demand induced a costly process
because response times to go stimuli were longer in high vs.
low demand conditions. However, response slowing was only
so intense that participants did not evoke too many omission
errors or too slow responses (i.e., response times > 500 ms),
which would have resulted in “too slow” feedbacks and depend-
ing on task condition also in monetary loss. Conclusively, par-
ticipants demonstrated a behavioral adjustment to go stimuli
in conjunction with an intensified conflict monitoring under
high cognitive demand (Weldon et al., 2013). We conclude that
individuals have possibly less cognitive control under higher
working-memory-related demand but show an intensified con-
flict monitoring in conjunction with response times slowing to
prevent errors.
In contrast to Leue et al. (2012a), we did not observe the
most negative N2 amplitudes in conditions with higher aversive
reinforcement and lower demand. In the present data, working-
memory-related demand overruled effects of aversive reinforce-
ment on conflict monitoring intensity, because—again in contrast
to Leue et al. (2012a)— we did not find a Region× Aversive rein-
forcement interaction indicating more negative N2 amplitudes
in the aversive reinforcement condition at frontal sites. Thus, we
conclude that working-memory-related demand is a more intense
manipulation of cognitive demand than the go-nogo ratio that
was applied as a manipulation of cognitive demand in other
studies (Schacht et al., 2009; Leue et al., 2012a). The stronger
effect of higher working memory load on the conflict monitoring
intensity suggests that more intense cognitive demand detracts
cognitive capacity from aversive signal processing.
REASONING ABILITY AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO ENGAGE IN CONFLICT
MONITORING
The second main result of this study refers to the role of aver-
sive reinforcement during conflict monitoring and its association
with individual differences of total reasoning scores. Individuals
with higher total reasoning ability demonstrated a more intense
conflict monitoring with increasing aversive reinforcement and
across task conditions they responded faster. These findings sug-
gest, in accordance with Weldon et al. (2013), that individuals
with higher total reasoning scores demonstrated a more flexible
engagement to conflict monitoring because they increased their
conflict monitoring when necessary and were faster than individ-
uals with lower total reasoning scores. Moreover, the effect that
individuals with higher reasoning ability intensified their conflict
monitoring with increasing aversive reinforcement (i.e., more
negative N2 amplitude) might suggest that the intensified conflict
monitoring in individuals with higher reasoning ability results
from a less intense recruitment of cognitive control. Thus, conflict
monitoring intensity and cognitive control are reciprocally linked
(cf. Botvinick et al., 1999; Kerns et al., 2004). That is, when conflict
monitoring intensity is high cognitive control is low. Although
conflict adaptation (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ullsperger et al., 2005;
Clayson and Larson, 2012) and the reciprocal association of con-
flict monitoring and recruitment of cognitive control (Botvinick
et al., 1999; Kerns et al., 2004) have not been investigated in this
study, we preliminarily suggest based on the N2 data and the
behavioral data that the association of conflict monitoring and
behavioral adjustments as observed by means of the behavioral
data might indicate reactive control (Braver et al., 2007; Braver,
2012). In the dual-mechanism of control, reactive control has
been related to transient activation of the PFC or related brain
systems like ACC (Braver et al., 2007). Reactive control is activated
specifically in the moment an intention arises (“just-in-time”
form of interference resolution) and it is reactivated by a trigger
(e.g., aversive feedback) at another time (Braver et al., 2007).
Thus, our data suggest that individuals with higher total reasoning
scores had an enhanced conflict monitoring (N2 amplitude)
especially when aversive reinforcement to errors was high (i.e.,
monetary loss) and they demonstrated more intense behavioral
adjustments like fasting response times. Although we could not
demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between conflict mon-
itoring intensity and recruitment of cognitive control explicitly
here, we could observe the subsequent behavioral consequences
of an enhanced conflict monitoring. This let us interpret the
conjunction of N2 data and behavioral data in individuals with
higher reasoning scores as some evidence of reactive control. By
suggesting this link between conflict monitoring and behavioral
adjustment we do not implicitly equate conflict monitoring and
cognitive control.
Similarly, individuals with combined higher verbal reason-
ing scores and higher trait-BIS scores showed a more intense
conflict monitoring especially to nogo stimuli. However, this
intensification of conflict monitoring (i.e., more negative nogo
N2 amplitude) co-occurred with a slight response times slowing
in higher trait-BIS individuals and, thus, was associated with a
more cautious response tendency in higher trait-BIS individuals.
It could be that the intensified conflict monitoring of participants
with higher trait-BIS and higher verbal reasoning scores reflects
an intensified processing of aversive reinforcement which is pos-
sibly induced by more pronounced rehearsal of the verbal self-
instruction to minimize monetary loss. The enhanced conflict
monitoring of higher trait-BIS individuals with higher verbal
reasoning scores may indicate that especially the combination of
aversive feedback avoidance in higher trait-BIS individuals (Gray
and McNaughton, 2000; Corr, 2008; Leue and Beauducel, 2008)
and the probably more intense rehearsal of verbal self-instructions
results in an intensified conflict monitoring. In summary, conflict
monitoring was enhanced in individuals with higher verbal rea-
soning ability only when high aversive reinforcement co-occurs
with higher sensitivity to aversive reinforcement (trait-BIS). This
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result illustrates the complexity of the relationship between per-
sonality and intelligence as it has already been discussed elsewhere
(Demetriou et al., 2003).
Interestingly, higher verbal reasoning scores alone were asso-
ciated with less intense conflict monitoring. This result was
unexpected and needs to be replicated before it can be taken
into account in further research. A tentative interpretation of this
result could be that higher verbal reasoning leads to more dis-
engagement from the genuine stimulus evaluation of the figural
go/nogo task because the figural task requirements did not match
the performance expectations of individuals with higher verbal
reasoning ability. However, the Gf main effect of the nogo N2
amplitude suggested that Gf as assessed by means of figural stimu-
lus material was related to a more intense conflict monitoring in a
go/nogo task that provided figural stimulus material (squares and
circles, respectively). Accordingly, the fact that both the measure
of Gf and the go/nogo task were based on figural material might
have enhanced the relation between Gf and conflict monitoring in
the present go/nogo task. To highlight the predicted relations on
cognitive and non-cognitive individual differences, experimen-
tally manipulated cognitive demand and aversive reinforcement
on the conflict monitoring intensity and behavioral adjustments,
we summarized these relations in Figure 7.
Together, these findings demonstrate that cognitive control
enhances more flexible adjustment to demanding situations in
individuals with higher reasoning ability (Braver et al., 2007;
Neubauer and Fink, 2009; Weldon et al., 2013). In contrast,
more intense cognitive control in individuals with higher trait-
BIS and higher verbal reasoning may be primarily related to
just-in-time reactive aversive feedback processing, which might
help to enhance conflict monitoring in order to prevent aver-
sive feedback. Verbal reasoning enhances the aversive feedback
processing in higher trait-BIS individuals so that in a task with
varying levels of cognitive demand the effects of trait-BIS and
aversive reinforcement are compatible with the idea of a more
intense reactive control strategy (Braver et al., 2007) and a more
intense processing of aversive feedback as postulated in rRST
(Gray and McNaughton, 2000; Corr, 2008; Leue and Beauducel,
2008; Weldon et al., 2013).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Since the present go/nogo task focused on figural stimulus mate-
rial, the role of verbal abilities during conflict monitoring needs
to be further explored in tasks providing more verbal stimulus
material. This is of special relevance, because the result of lower
conflict monitoring in individuals with higher verbal reasoning
ability was unexpected and in contrast with the higher conflict
monitoring found for individuals with higher reasoning ability
under higher aversive reinforcement. Moreover, Eysenck et al.
(2007) proposed that more anxious individuals are prone to
processing inefficiency (i.e., more resources are recruited to per-
form well) and Moser et al. (2013) demonstrated that Error-
related Negativity (ERN) is an index of this inefficiency. In the
context of response-related error monitoring, higher anxious
individuals rely on more error monitoring resources than lower
anxious individuals to achieve a comparable performance (or
even perform worse than lower anxious individuals). Basten et al.
(2012) demonstrated lower processing efficiency in high anxious
individuals in a working memory task. Since Basten et al. (2012)
found lower processing efficiency in high anxious individuals
when a task requiring WMC is performed, it could be expected
that reduced processing efficiency of higher anxious individuals
might occur in the context of conflict monitoring when a more
substantial amount of working memory demand is incorporated
into a go/nogo task. Our data demonstrate that higher trait-BIS
individuals intensify their conflict monitoring even in conditions
with low aversive reinforcement (i.e., verbal error or too slow
feedback). This finding parallels to Leue et al. (2012b) who also
found the most intense conflict monitoring of higher trait-BIS
individuals in conditions with less intense aversive reinforce-
ment. Irrespective of task conditions, higher trait-BIS individu-
als showed a higher sensitivity d′ compared to lower trait-BIS
individuals. These findings support the idea that higher trait-
BIS individuals are less flexible in adapting their conflict mon-
itoring intensity depending on cognitive demand requirements
and negative consequences. Instead they invest more resources in
advance to perform well. Thus, processing inefficiency of higher
trait-BIS individuals can be already observed during conflict
monitoring, not only during response-related error monitoring.
The interplay of stimulus-related conflict monitoring as inves-
tigated in this study and response-related error monitoring in
terms of processing inefficiency in anxious individuals needs to
be explored in future studies. Finally, Donkers and van Boxtel
(2004) argue that the N2 amplitude indicates conflict monitoring
because more negative N2 amplitudes were not only observed to
nogo stimuli but also to rarely occurring go stimuli, which did
not require response inhibition. Moreover, Bruin et al. (2001)
observed that the N2 amplitude was not affected by response
priming in a go/nogo task. That is why the authors concluded
that the N2 amplitude is not associated with response inhibition.
Instead Bruin et al. (2001) suggested the frontal P3 to be an
indicator of response inhibition (see also, Mennes et al., 2008).
As becomes apparent from these studies there is evidence that the
N2 amplitude represents rather conflict monitoring than response
inhibition in go/nogo tasks. However, as long as those studies that
simultaneously analyze and interpret stimulus-locked N2- and
P3-findings are rare, it cannot be completely excluded that the
N2 amplitude might be also conceived as an indicator of response
inhibition.
CONCLUSIONS
Our data suggest that the manipulation of working memory load
is an effective manipulation of cognitive demand and conflict
monitoring intensity in a go/nogo task. Conflict monitoring was
in particular intensified under high cognitive demand resulting in
a more negative fronto-central mean nogo N2 amplitude. Thus,
cognitive demand leads to an intensified stimulus evaluation dur-
ing conflict monitoring resulting in behavioral adjustments. Indi-
viduals with higher total reasoning ability showed a more intense
N2-related conflict monitoring with increasing aversive rein-
forcement but shorter go response times. These findings suggest
that individuals with higher reasoning ability show more intense
working-memory-related conflict monitoring and subsequently
more flexible behavioral adjustments. Higher fluid intelligence
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(Gf) as measured by figural abilities appeared to facilitate conflict
monitoring in our figural go/nogo task, whereas verbal abilities
did not contribute to a more intense conflict monitoring. Based
on this finding, we draw the preliminary conclusion that more
intense conflict monitoring might occur when specific reasoning
abilities and stimulus material of a task match. Conflict moni-
toring to nogo stimuli was also more intense in individuals with
higher trait-BIS and verbal reasoning scores, but response times
to go stimuli in higher trait-BIS individuals were slightly slower
with increasing aversive reinforcement. These findings indicate
that an intensification of conflict monitoring in higher trait-
BIS individuals is related to situations with externally applied
aversive reinforcement but not directly associated with cognitive
demand requirements. Moreover, avoidance of error feedback
is predominant in higher trait-BIS individuals irrespective of
required working-memory-related cognitive demand.
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